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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 ABSTRACT 
 
The current research is a statistical analysis of accidents that occurred during the 
period 1990- 2011 for cellular Containerships that were built after 1981 and with a 
gross tonnage (GT) greater than 999. The research consists of two parts, related to 
each other. The first part contains a detailed analysis of all the incidents involving 
ships that at the time of the accident were registered to members of the 
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS). The incidents are divided 
in eight categories, as follows: 
 Collision incidents 
 Contact incidents 
 Explosion incidents 
 Fire incidents 
 Grounding incidents 
 Hull fittings failure incidents 
 Machinery failure incidents 
 Non-accidental structural failure incidents 
In all categories a comparison of serious and non-serious accidents is conducted at 
the end of each paragraph. After all categories are analyzed, an aggregated 
paragraph follows for all the IACS Ships. 
The second part consists of the analysis of serious accidents on ships that at the time 
of the incident were not registered to an IACS member and compared with serious 
accidents of ships registered to IACS members. 
In both analyses the incidents caused either by unknown reasons or by piracy and 
war losses were not considered in the study. 
All data used in this research were provided by the Germanischer Lloyd. Both parts 
of the study contain only the IHS Database. 
For the purpose of this analysis the SDL (Ship Design Laboratory) database was 
created at the NTUA (National Technical University of Athens). A manual of the 
NTUA-SDL database can be found in Annex I. 
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1.2 SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
 
In the current study only accidents of containerships built after 1981 and with a 
gross tonnage (GT) greater than 999 are included. The statistical analysis consists of 
two parts. 
At first, ships that were registered to IACS members are being investigated. Each 
type of incident (see 1.1) is analyzed separately with a comparison for serious and 
non- serious accidents. A summarized analysis on all accidents follows. 
In the second part of the study a contrast is carried out between ships that were 
registered to an IACS member at the time of the incident and those which were not. 
Only serious accidents are included. 
The objective of the analysis is to emphasize on the consequences of the accidents 
on every aspect (loss of cargo, repairs, impact on human life, environmental effects). 
The results from the aforementioned comparison will be stated on the last 
paragraph (6. Conclusions). Furthermore, this risk analysis constitutes the second 
step of the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) that will lead to the identification of the 
risk control options, as well as the financial cost for the prevention of such risks. 
2. GENERAL INFORMATION 
2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
There are two main types of dry cargo: bulk cargo and break bulk cargo. Bulk 
cargoes, like grain or coal, are transported unpackaged in the hull of the ship, 
generally in large volume [1]. Break-bulk cargoes, on the other hand, are transported 
in packages, and are generally manufactured goods [2]. Before the advent of 
containerization in the 1950s, break-bulk items were loaded, lashed, unlashed and 
unloaded from the ship one piece at a time. Afterwards the successful application in 
the land transports, the use of containers was extended in the coastal transports and 
by the dues of the 50s in the open sea transports with the refit/conversion of 
existing cargo ships. By the means of the 60s is observed an explosive development 
in the designing and manufacture of a specialized type of ship for the transport of 
containers, the known today containership. Containerization has increased the 
efficiency of moving traditional break-bulk cargoes significantly, reducing shipping 
time by 84% and costs by 35% [3]. Cargo that once arrived in cartons, crates, bales, 
barrels or bags now comes in factory sealed containers, with no indication to the 
human eye of their contents, except for a product code that machines can scan and 
computers trace. This system of tracking has been so exact that a two week voyage 
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can be timed for arrival with an accuracy of less than fifteen minutes. It has resulted 
in such revolutions as on time guaranteed delivery and just in time manufacturing. 
 
2.2 CONTAINERIZATION OF CARGO 
 
It has prevailed internationally the standardized ISO container with traverse cross-
section 8 feet x 8 feet. The height 8 feet (or 2.435m) resulted from the being in effect 
limits for the road transport in the USA (and later worldwide) for the passage of 
vehicles under the bridges. Characteristic length of the standardized ISO containers 
is 20 feet (TEU: Twenty feet Equivalent Unit container, type ISO – 1C).  There have 
been standardized also other sizes of containers - multiple or submultiple of the 
length of the basic TEU – such as containers 40 feet (FEU: Forty feet Equivalent Unit 
container, type ISO – 1A) and the preferred from certain companies in USA 
containers 30 feet (type ISO – 1B), 10 feet (type ISO – 1D) and 62/3 feet. TEUs require 
clean volume of hulls 38.19 c.m. Two TEUs with intermediary gap of 3 inches 
correspond in the length of one FEU, which corresponds in the classic length of hulls 
of the containerships [4].  
     In the following table there is a summary of all types of containers that are in use 
nowadays (standardized ISO container) [5]: 
Designation Length Height Width Maximum gross 
weight 
 mm ft in mm ft in mm ft in kg lb 
1A 12,192 40  2,438 8  2,438 8  30,480 67,200 
1AA 12,192 40  2,591 8 6 2,438 8  30,480 67,200 
1B 9,125 29 111/4 2,438 8  2,438 8  25,400 56,000 
1BB 9,125 29 111/4 2,591 8 6 2,438 8  25,400 56,000 
1C 6,058 19 111/4 2,438 8  2,438 8  20,320 44,800 
1CC 6,058 19 111/4 2,591 8 6 2,438 8  20,320 44,800 
1D 2,991 9 91/4 2,438 8  2,438 8  10,160 22,400 
1E 1,968 6 51/2 2,438 8  2,438 8  7,110 15,700 
1F 1,460 4 91/2 2,438 8  2,438 8  5,080 11,200 
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2.3 GENERATIONS OF CONTAINERSHIPS 
 
Containerships are distinguished nowadays into six generations: The first 
generation of containerships was composed of modified bulk vessels or tankers that 
could transport up 1,000 TEUs. Once the container began to be massively adopted at 
the beginning of the 1970s, the construction of the first cellular 
containerships (second generation) entirely dedicated for handling containers 
started. All these ships were much faster (20-25 knots) and were composed of cells 
lodging containers in stacks of different height depending on the capacity. Capacity 
was increased as a result of the removal of cranes. Economies of scale rapidly 
pushed for the construction of larger containerships in the 1980s.  The size limit of 
the Panama Canal, which came to be known as the panamax standard, was 
achieved in 1985 with a capacity of about 4,000 TEUs (third generation).  By 1996 
full-fledged fourth generation of containerships were introduced and capacities 
reached 6,600 TEUs. Once the panamax threshold was breached, ship size quickly 
went to the fifth generation (Post Panamax Plus) with capacities reaching 8,000 
TEUs ("S Class"). By 2006, sixth generation containerships came online when the 
maritime shipper Maersk introduced a new class having a capacity in the range of 
11,000 to 14,500 TEUs, the Emma Maersk, (E Class). This generation will take two 
specifications. The first will take the shape of "New Panamax", with ships designed 
to fit exactly in the locks of the expanded Panama Canal, expected to open in 2014, 
and which confers capacity of up to 12,500 TEU. The second can be dubbed "Post 
New Panamax" since these ships are bigger than the expanded Panama Canal 
specifications and can handle up to about 18,000 TEU (Triple E Class). It remains to 
be seen which routes and ports these ships would service, but they are limited [6]. 
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Depending on the TEU size and hull dimensions, containers vessels can be also 
divided into the following main groups or classes [7]: 
 
Group / Class Number of TEU 
Small Feeder Up to 1000 
Feeder 1001 – 2800 
Panamax 2801 – 5100 
Post-Panamax 5101 – 10000 
New-Panamax 10001 – 14500 
ULCV 14501 and higher 
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According to Containerization International, the world’s container ship fleet as May 
2011 is [8]:  
Size range (TEU) Vessel number Total capacity (TEU) 
Less than 1,499 1,869 1,504,327 
1,500-2,999 1,298 2,804,212 
3,000-4,999 935 3,766,532 
5,000-7,999 593 3,576,182 
8,000-9,999 232 198,399 
10,000-12,499 43 464,784 
over 12,500 50 667,466 
 
 
2.4 DESIGN ISSUES 
 
There have been some significant changes over the years as far as the containerships 
are concerned. In the 60s the break-bulk ships were supplanted by the 
containerships. Today, another change maybe at hand, namely the advent of the 
open top containership. This kind of ship is also known as a hatch-less ship. 
 
 
 
There are several advantages for the hatchless ships: 
 The elimination of hatch covers – and therefore their weight – results in an 
increase of the deadweight. Furthermore, since the hatch covers were 
located high in the ship, their removal significantly improves stability. 
 The removal of hatch covers reduces time (open/close of hatches) and the 
cargo operation costs. 
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 There is a better securing for the containers stowed above deck. 
Furthermore, there is no need for manually installed lashing cables or rods. 
 Individual vertical stocks are easily accessible. 
 Security gear for hatches becomes unnecessary. 
Normally, the International Convention of Load Lines (ILLC) doesn’t allow ships 
without hatches but the Convention provides exemptions from this restriction: 
“The Administration may exempt any ship which embodies features of a novel kind 
from any of the provisions of this Convention the application of which might 
seriously impede research into the development of such features and their 
incorporation in ships engaged on international voyages. 
The Administration which allows any exemption under this Article shall communicate 
to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).  An International Load Line 
Exemption Certificate shall be issued to any ship to which an exemption has been 
granted.” [9] 
 
2.5 SAFETY ISSUES 
 
The shipping stresses that are observed during a voyage can be divided into two 
main categories: the avoidable which are due to the human influence and the 
unavoidable which are determined by the nature of the transport operation. These 
stresses are: 
 Static: According to CTUs guideline: “Stowage planning should take account of the 
fact that CTUs are generally designed and handled assuming the cargo to be evenly 
distributed over the entire floor area. Where substantial deviations from uniform 
packing occur, special advice for preferred packing should be sought.” 
Maximum floor loading values for TEUs are 14kN/m2 and for FEUs 10kN/m2. 
  
 Dynamic: A primary distinction is drawn between vibration and jolting. Vibration 
comprises periodic oscillations whereas jolting occasional events. Vibration and 
jolting of the equipment used, together with the fundamental vibration of goods, is 
of great significance. The magnitude of the pulses (duration of forces) play a very 
important role. In the high frequency range, where up to few hundred g have been 
measured, the cargo thanks to the mass inertia of the cargo shipping is not in danger 
by such short duration impacts. But in the low frequency range, longer period of 
action may lead to shifting of the cargo and consequent mechanical damage. 
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 Mechanical 
Linear motion Rotational motion 
Surge: motion along the longitudinal axis Roll: motion around the longitudinal axis 
Sway: motion along the transverse axis Pitch: motion around the transverse axis 
Heave: motion along the vertical axis Yaw: motion around the vertical axis 
 
During surging and swaying, the hull may be subjected to considerable torsion 
forces. Heaving has been observed that has an effect on the containers and the 
cargo inside. Yawing does not cause any shipping damage. As far as pitching is 
concerned, it has been noticed that during upward motion the stack pressures rise, 
whereas during downward motion the pressures fall. Rolling up to 30o isn’t unusual 
in the open sea and all the containers must be adequate secured. Both rolling and 
pitching may result in cargo slippage. It has been estimated that container ships lose 
between 2,000 and 10,000 containers at sea each year, costing $370 million per 
year.  
At this point it must be pointed out that are not always the hazards of the sea which 
cause the damage but most commonly the home-grown accelerations of the cargo, 
which are forces arising from shortcomings in packing and securing. Such home-
grown accelerations may lead to bulges (i.e. forces acting from the inside outwards). 
Generally, goods are exposed to stress from the extremely low oscillations generated 
by sea conditions and by higher frequency machinery and propeller vibration. Also 
during slamming vibration is transferred to cargo. 
The absolute acceleration values on the ships are even than on the road but the 
frequency with which motion occurs is important. According to CTU’s guidelines: “All 
shipping packages must accordingly be constructed so as to be able to withstand 0.8 
times the weight of all adjacently stored cargo and twice the mass of the cargo 
loaded on top. If this not the case, appropriate protective measures must be taken.” 
[11] 
 
2.6 LASHING SYSTEMS 
 
Numerous systems are used to secure containers aboard ships, depending on factors 
such as the type of ship, the type of container and the location of the container. The 
stresses resulting from the ship’s movements and wind pressure must be taken into 
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account. Forces resulting from breaking-wave impact can only be taken into account 
to a certain degree. All the containers on board must be secured against slippage 
and toppling.  
Containers are usually stowed lengthwise fore and aft on board. This stowage 
method is sensible as far as the stresses in rough seas and the loading capacity of 
containers are concerned. Stresses in rough seas are greater athwartships than fore 
and aft and the loading capacity of container side walls is designed to be higher that 
of the end walls. However, on many ships containers are also stowed athwartships 
on board. This stowage method is not sensible with regard to the stresses in the 
rough seas. It is less possible that containers are stowed both ways on board. This 
stowage method requires greater effort during packing and securing operations. 
Various ways of securing containers in holds and on deck: 
 Securing in vessel holds by cell guides alone 
The greatest stress the containers are exposed to stems from stack pressure. Lateral 
stress is transmitted by each container to the cell guides and therefore the risk of 
damage is kept within tight limits. The rails of the cell guides are useful for the 
guidance of the containers during loading and unloading. 
 
 Securing in vessel holds by cell guides and pins 
This securing method is appropriate for the carriage of containers of different 
dimensions. 
 
 Securing in vessel holds by conventional securing and stacked stowage 
The containers are connected together by single or double stacking cones and or 
twist locks and the entire stack is lashed through lashing wires or rods and 
turnbuckles. This system is not as safe as that with cell guides and was used mainly 
on old, conventional general cargo vessels and multipurpose freighters.  
 
 Securing in vessel holds by block stowage and stabilization 
This method is still found on some conbulkers and other multipurpose freighters. 
Containers are interconnected horizontally and vertically using stacking cones. The 
top tiers are connected by means of bridge fittings and to the side ‘’pressure/tension 
elements’’ are used. The entire block can move constantly in rough seas and if an 
individual container breaks, the whole block will be affected. 
 Securing on deck using container guides 
On some ships, containers are secured on deck in cell guides and/or lashing frames. 
In certain ships, cell guides can be pushed hydraulically over the hatch as soon as the 
hatches have been covered up.  
 
 Securing on deck using block stowage securing 
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This securing method is not economically efficient nowadays but is being used 
increasingly in very large containerships. Socket elements or fixed cones are used for 
the positioning of the containers in the bottom layer and all the containers are held 
together by cross lashings. 
 
 Securing on deck using stacked stowage securing 
This method is the most frequent an its advantage is the cargo handling flexibility. 
The containers are stacked one on top of the other, connected with twist locks and 
lashed vertically.  
In order to locate an individual container in the ship, the bay-row-tier system is being 
used (relating to length, width and height). [10] 
 
2.7 CONTAINERIZED CARGO AND HAZARDS 
 
Assessing the risks associated with containerized cargo transport is challenging due 
to the variability and range of cargo that can be present on the container ship. Most 
containerships comply with SOLAS regulations regarding construction and 
equipment requirements for carriage of dangerous goods, for at least some of the 
holds and open deck spaces. However, the type and amount of dangerous goods 
carried can vary considerably for individual ships and routes. The hazards associated 
with each class of dangerous goods are also varied and are related to the inherent 
characteristics of the dangerous goods themselves. They include properties such as 
corrosiveness, explosiveness, toxicity, radioactivity and flammability. The carriage of 
dangerous goods can affect the probability for fire and explosion on a containership 
and the consequences of incidents where the cargo is released. In some cases 
dangerous goods may be the high-level cause of an incident. Undeclared dangerous 
goods have been identified as the cause of a number of serious accidents, such as 
the fire that broke out on the container vessel Kitano on 22 March 2001 when it was 
sailing en route from New York to Halifax, Canada. According to the Transport Safety 
Board of Canada report, the following occurred: 
The fire originated in an above deck container, which held active carbon pellets that 
were transported as undeclared cargo. The fire spread to four containers but was 
eventually extinguished with assistance from firefighters from a salvage company 
after the vessel anchored in Halifax harbor. As part of the accident investigation, 
tests were carried out on the activated carbon pellets to determine whether the 
pellets should have been classified as dangerous goods. The UN N.4 test results for 
the substance were consistent with the classification of Class 4.2 (substances liable 
to spontaneous combustion), Packing Group III, when transported in volumes 
15 
 
KOPOUKIS APOSTOLOS DIPLOMA THESIS NTUA 2013 
greater than 3 m3. The packages carried on the Kitano were less than 3 m3 and thus 
did not need to be declared as dangerous goods. There were no crew injuries as a 
result of this fire. In total 15 containers in the area of the fire suffered some degree 
of smoke, fire, or water damage. The only apparent damage to the vessel was 
superficial damage to the coating on the hatch cover. 
The accidental release of dangerous cargo as a result of container damage, fire, 
leaks, etc. can result in human consequences for the crew and potentially for third 
parties, environmental impacts and damage to the vessel. The extent of 
consequences depends on the type and quantity of goods released. Some goods 
such as toxic gases will have a more serious implication for crew health and safety, 
as well potential for third party impacts if the vessel is in port near populated areas. 
Some dangerous goods are marine pollutants while others are quite innocuous if 
release to the marine environment. [12] 
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3. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 SOURCE OF DATA 
 
All Incidents’ info was given by the Germanischer Lloyd. The database that was used 
is IHS Fairplay, evolved from the Lloyd’s Register of Ships and is characterized as the 
world’s largest maritime library. 
 
3.1.1 IHS DATABASE 
The database that was used consists of both Serious  and Non-Serious Incidents, as 
well as Ships that at the time of the incident were registered to an IACS member or 
not. All the names of Tables that are henceforth mentioned, can be found in the 
NTUA-SDL database. The following table shows the basic distribution of data (the 
percentage in parenthesis is based on column’s data, while the number under 
Percentage column refers to the total of the row data): 
 
 IACS Non IACS Percentage 
Serious 1064(81.91%) 40(81.63%) 81.89% 
Non-Serious 235(18.09%) 9(18.37%) 18.11% 
TOTAL 1299 49 100% 
 
The first observation is the insignificant difference between the percentages of the 
Serious and Non-Serious incidents on IACS and Non IACS ships. The fact though that 
Non IACS ships are much less than IACS ships does not lead to a safe conclusion. 
Therefore a detailed analysis is required. 
 
3.1.2 IACS AND NON IACS FLEET 
 
 
The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) consists nowadays of 
13 member societies, details of which are listed below. The directory of IACS is on a 
rotational basis with each member society taking a turn.  
17 
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Class Long Class 
American Bureau of Shipping ABS 
Bureau Veritas BV 
China Class Society CCS 
Croatian Register CRS 
Det Norske Veritas DNV 
Germanischer Lloyd GL 
Indian Register of Shipping IRS 
Korean Register of Shipping KR 
Lloyd’s Register LR 
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai NK 
Polish Register of Shipping PRS 
Registro Italiano Navale RINA 
Russian Maritime Register of Shipping RS 
 
The Fleet at risk for both IACS and Non IACS ships is shown in the following table and 
diagram: 
 
Year Fleet-IACS  Fleet-Non IACS Fleet-Unknown Fleet-Sum 
1982 14,58 5,00 5,41 24,99 
1983 54,07 12,50 17,90 84,47 
1984 102,25 15,75 32,00 150,00 
1985 160,47 19,83 47,65 227,96 
1986 212,32 23,00 57,82 293,13 
1987 262,06 27,25 66,74 356,05 
1988 294,58 29,58 70,00 394,15 
1989 334,65 33,33 73,07 441,05 
1990 377,39 38,66 75,58 491,63 
1991 449,13 41,75 82,00 572,88 
1992 529,57 46,83 87,00 663,40 
1993 613,36 50,58 91,66 755,61 
1994 742,93 56,00 94,92 893,84 
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Year Fleet-IACS  Fleet-Non IACS Fleet-Unknown Fleet-Sum 
1995 881,19 60,67 101,16 1043,01 
1996 1064,03 66,58 103,12 1233,72 
1997 1267,03 73,66 103,92 1444,62 
1998 1525,28 84,25 105,63 1715,16 
1999 1694,93 89,50 114,41 1898,84 
2000 1824,87 92,75 118,00 2035,62 
2001 1988,25 99,74 118,33 2206,32 
2002 2190,20 101,33 119,00 2410,54 
2003 2377,70 103,00 119,00 2599,69 
2004 2551,48 104,75 119,58 2775,82 
2005 2774,13 108,74 122,33 3005,20 
2006 3092,08 111,33 128,40 3331,81 
2007 3476,73 112,66 130,99 3720,38 
2008 3900,48 116,16 138,13 4154,76 
2009 4183,71 117,64 127,51 4428,86 
2010 4399,86 110,64 100,03 4610,53 
2011 4587,88 108,81 93,64 4790,33 
Total 47797,61 2062,28 2764,93 52754,39 
 
The decimals digits on any number are the result of the calculation of Fleet at Risk. 
For each year, the given number is the total sum of active ships per month- for all 
months- divided by 12. Therefore, if a ship was active in May of 1985, it would lead 
to a result of 0.67 for the specified year. 
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3.1.3 DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS 
 
As mentioned in paragraph 2.3, the Containerships that are under this study can be 
distributed in 7 categories by Generation and 6 categories by Ship Type. 
 
3.1.3.1 BY GENERATION 
 
 
An important discrepancy is the large amount of 1st Generation’s Non IACS Ships that 
leads to smaller percentages on 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Generation’s Ships. The 
percentage on 2nd Generation’s Ships is similar on both IACS and Non IACS Ships. The 
fact ULCV’s percentage is much higher in Non IACS Ships, is probably because of the 
small sample of Ships. 
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3.1.3.2 BY SHIP TYPE 
 
 
The above pie charts lead to the exact same conclusion as the ones from paragraph 
3.1.3.1. 
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3.2 DEFINITIONS 
3.2.1 RISK EVALUATION 
 
In the analysis that follows, only the risk associated to the ship- that is under study- 
is being considered. Any hazard or injury on any other ship is noted on the relevant 
record, but is considered as external factor. For example, if a containership has a 
collision with another ship and the latter sinks or a crew member is missing after the 
accident, none of these is under investigation in the analysis. 
 
3.2.2 MAIN ACCIDENT CATEGORIES 
 
As mentioned above, the main categories of the analysis are eight (8) and every 
category is divided in subcategories: 
1) Collision: Any incident that includes a containership and another vessel, 
regardless of the operational state. 
Subcategories- options: struck, striking, unknown 
2) Contact: Any contact of a containership with an object that has no 
mechanical propulsion or steering system and therefore is not considered as 
a vessel 
Subcategories- options: floating objects, fixed installation 
3) Explosion: Any incident that includes an explosion as the initial event 
Subcategories- options: explosion location, explosion ignition 
Explosion location: in Aft area, on deck cargo area, in ballast tanks/void 
spaces, in hold cargo area, in Fore peak area 
In Aft area: fuel tank, boiler, engine room, accommodation 
Explosion ignition: electrostatic charges, cooking related, heating 
equipment, hot works, smoking related, electrical faults, broken fuel pipe, 
self-ignition, containers’ content, engine’s crankcase, unknown 
4) Fire: Any incident that includes a fire as the initial event 
Subcategories- options: fire starting location, fire ignition 
Fire starting location: internal source, external source, lightning 
Internal source: in Aft area, on deck cargo area, in ballast tanks/void 
spaces, in hold cargo area, in Fore peak area 
In Aft area: on superstructure, other areas, engine room 
On superstructure: accommodation, bridge 
5) Grounding: being aground or hitting/touching shore or sea bottom 
Subcategories- options: drift, powered, unknown 
Drift grounding: loss of power system, loss of steering system 
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Powered grounding: detected but not avoided, squat effect, not detected 
6) Hull fittings failure: any damage to ship’s hull-fitting equipment/outfitting, 
affecting ship’s seaworthiness or efficiency 
Subcategories- options: equipment failure, misuse of equipment 
Equipment failure: failure of closing systems, chain locker failure, manhole 
failure, water leakage through ventilation lines, outfitting failure, lashing 
failure 
Misuse of equipment: misuse of chain locker, manhole left open, 
ventilation lines incorrectly open, misuse of loading equipment. 
7) Machinery failure: any technical failure of machinery or related system that 
affects vessel’s seaworthiness 
Subcategories- options: steering system failure, propulsion system failure, 
rudder damage, propeller damage, bow thruster problem, turbo charger 
problem, other 
8) Non-accidental structural failure: any incident caused by the existence of 
cracks and fractures on ship’s hull, affecting ship’s seaworthiness 
Subcategories- options: structural degradation, poor design/construction, 
excessive loading 
Excessive loading: operation in abnormal conditions, ballast related, cargo 
related 
 
It is noted that any incident caused by unknown reasons as well as incidents 
associated with war losses or piracy are not considered in the study. Cases of 
occupational accidents are also not included. 
 
3.2.3 OPERATIONAL STATE 
 
In the NTUA- SDL database the operational state of the vessel under investigation is 
divided into eleven (11) categories: At Berth, Port, Anchorage, Port Approach, 
Coastal Waters (<12miles off), Shipyard, Archipelagos, Inland Waters, Canals, Rivers 
and Open Sea. 
Based on the fact that in various operational states the restrictions on vessel’s 
service speed are the same, we therefore divide the operational state into four (4) 
main categories: 
 Terminal Areas: (At Berth, Port, Anchorage, Port Approach) The vessel is 
either at low service speed or stationary at Berth/ Port. As a result, the 
probability of a serious accident is low and the hazards of one are limited. 
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 Operation in Congested Waters: (Coastal Waters) This type of areas are 
marked as high traffic locations. 
 Open Sea: (Open Sea, Archipelagos) The vessel is at full service speed, but has 
the capability of manoeuvring to avoid accidents with other ships. 
 Limited Waters: (Inland Waters, Canals, Rivers) Vessel is on reduced speed 
and has restrictions on manoeuvers that can be operated. 
 
3.2.4 LOWI OCCURRENCE 
 
The probability of hull breaching in case of an accident is considered essential for the 
sequence of events and consequences of an accident. For the purpose of this study, 
the NTUA-SDL database is used to determine this probability with respect to the 
navigational accidents. In some cases, it is clear from the complementary texts of the 
database that LOWI occurred. 
In a number of collision incidents, LOWI was not occurred because the involved 
vessel was small in comparison to the containership (i.e. fishing vessel) or it is clearly 
stated that the containership did not sustain damage. 
In contact or grounding incidents, the containership sustained propeller damage due 
to contact with an object or grounding. These cases are considered as incidents with 
no LOWI occurrence. 
When there was no clear statement, the following assumptions were taken into 
consideration in order to calculate the probability of hull breaching. 
 
No LOWI occurrence: 
 
 “No damage reported” is stated. 
 The point of impact is above the main deck planting (i.e. superstructure). 
 There is no relevant information regarding renewal of side shell planting. 
 The containership sustains only minor or slight damage. 
 
LOWI occurrence: 
 
 “Extent of damage was not known” is stated. 
 “The damage is below/ above waterline” is stated. 
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3.3 NTUA - SDL SHIP ACCIDENTS DATABASE 
 
Over the years, the marine incident databases, which have evolved, were not 
designed with the application of a possible risk assessment in mind, and therefore 
suffer from a number of serious limitations which make their usage in engineering 
projects problematic. Consequently, the development of the NTUA-SDL Ship 
Accidents Database was necessary. 
Initially, only the IHS database was available. All the incidents of the IHS database 
were searched individually on the web in order to gather more information on every 
incident. If the source was reliable, the information would be populated. This 
process was very helpful because we also became familiar with the nature of the 
incidents on containerships.  
The next step was to develop the NTUA-SDL Ship Accidents Database. The respective 
database of the tankers was very useful as far as the structure of the new database 
for the containerships is concerned. In the meantime, general information regarding 
the containerships was searched.  
 Afterwards, the LMIU and GISIS databases became also available. All the records 
were double-checked in order to find out which incidents weren’t recorded in the 
IHS database. All these incidents were also searched individually on the web. All this 
process was laborious because all the new data had to be checked over and over 
again. Moreover, the NTUA-SDL database was refreshed frequently and its structure 
changed many times until its final form.  
Germanischer Lloyd also provided us with the investigation reports of some incidents 
from GISIS database. This was very helpful because these reports contained all the 
necessary information with details. Furthermore, this will be useful for the filling up 
of the Fault Trees and Event Trees in the next studies. The accidents of both LMIU 
and GISIS will not be investigated in the present analysis. 
The analysis will be achieved through the recording of the causes of each incident, 
the location where the accident took place, the operating condition of the ship, the 
prevailing weather condition / weather impact, the consequences of the incident on 
the ship and the crew on board, and the pollution of the environment or the loss of 
cargo if occurred.  
The results of the analysis are presented in the following chapters. A manual of the 
SDL-database can be found in Annex I. 
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4. ANALYSIS OF IACS SHIPS’ INCIDENTS 
4.1 COLLISION INCIDENTS 
4.1.1 CONDITIONS OF COLLISION ACCIDENTS 
 
Event Location 
 
Operational State 
 
As expected, the majority of collision incidents take place at congested waters and 
terminal areas, where a serious number of vessels are overcrowded. The limit of 
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space- and the need to manoeuver within it- in such places seems to overcome the 
restrictions on speed of ships. 
Operating Condition 
 
In the chart above, it is obvious that most of the ships involved in a collision are en-
route (nearly 78%), whether the accident occurred because of weather conditions or 
human error. 
Loading Conditions 
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Collision Type 
 
As it can be seen, the percentages between the three cases are close to each other 
and no conclusion can be drawn. 
Weather Impact 
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The fact that 76.47% of the incidents have no information about the weather 
reported could be a parameter that should be investigated in the future. On the 
other hand, this might be an indication that weather is not such an important factor 
that is why it is not reported. 
 
4.1.2 CONSEQUENCES OF COLLISION ACCIDENTS 
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Outcome 
 
Major repairs 
239 
54,07% 
Minor repairs 
174 
39,37% 
No damage 
reported 
27 
6,11% 
No damage 
sustained 
2 
0,45% 
Collision Incidents - Repairs 
Sailed by her 
means 
412 
93,21% 
Towed away 
30 
6,79% 
Collision Incidents - Outcome 
29 
 
KOPOUKIS APOSTOLOS DIPLOMA THESIS NTUA 2013 
LOss of Water Integrity(LOWI) 
 
Injuries/ Fatalities 
 
The above statistics concern only three accidents out of a total of 442 collision 
incidents and all of them considered as serious. 
Loss of Payload 
In total, 250 containers were lost overboard, despite the fact that only 15 incidents 
involved Loss of Payload. 
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Release of Oil 
 
The release of Oil is minor as a percentage, but considerable as an amount of 620 
tonnes. 
Release of hazardous Cargo 
 
So is the release of cargo that can be harmful to the environment or human. 
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4.1.3 FREQUENCIES OF COLLISION ACCIDENTS 
 
 
As it can be seen, most ships were built during the period 1993- 2003 with a peak on 
1996- 1997. 
 
The number of accidents tends to increase over the years, a fact that is also 
explained by the following diagram. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
19
81
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
1
9
9
6
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
0 
15 
7 
11 
14 
13 
7 
6 7 
12 13 
14 
20 
25 
29 30 30 
26 
9 
17 
22 
19 
17 17 
16 
15 
11 
9 
7 
4 
0 
Collision Incidents - Ships Built per Year 
8 
2 
4 4 
6 
10 9 10 
18 
16 
14 
10 
24 
22 
35 
30 
40 
37 37 36 
43 
27 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Collision Incidents - Incidents per Year 
32 
 
KOPOUKIS APOSTOLOS DIPLOMA THESIS NTUA 2013 
 
The increased number of ships leads to more accidents, but it is noticeable that the 
younger ships have the most. 
 
With an exception during 2004- 2006, the frequencies of collision incidents are 
around 1% of the fleet. 
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4.1.4 COMPARISON OF SERIOUS AND NON-SERIOUS ACCIDENTS 
 
 
As far as the severity of the accidents, the majority of them are considered as 
serious. 
The following chart indicates the distribution of LOWI and Non LOWI accidents for 
different severity. 
 
Every accident that involved release of Oil or Hazardous cargo was considered as 
serious. 
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4.2 CONTACT INCIDENTS 
4.2.1 CONDITIONS OF CONTACT ACCIDENTS 
 
Event Location  
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Operational State 
 
The majority of contact incidents take place at terminal areas and limited waters. 
Operating Condition 
 
Sailing and at berth accidents are the main categories on operating conditions. 
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Loading Conditions 
 
Contact Type 
 
Contact accidents mainly occur due to contact with fixed installations and 
secondarily with floating objects. 
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Weather Impact 
 
The parameter of weather here is unknown for most of the incidents. 
4.2.2 CONSEQUENCES OF CONTACT ACCIDENTS 
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Outcome 
  
LOss of Water Integrity(LOWI) 
  
Injuries/ Fatalities 
No injury or fatality occurred. 
Loss of Payload 
Only 1 accident led to loss of Payload, with a total number of 14 TEUs included. 
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Release of Oil 
 
  
The release of Oil is minor as a percentage, but considerable as an amount of 1833 
tonnes. 
Release of hazardous Cargo 
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4.2.3 FREQUENCIES OF CONTACT ACCIDENTS 
 
 
1996 is the year with the most ships built. 
 
Since 1999 and 2006 there is a big increase in contact incidents. Average for the 
years 1993- 1998 is 1.66 incidents per year, while for 1999- 2005 and 2006- 2011 it is 
5.57 and 12.33 respectively. 
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Ships built after 1994 tend to have more contact accidents. 
 
Contact incidents do not have a steady, increasing or decreasing, progress that could 
lead to a conclusion. 
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4.2.4 COMPARISON OF SERIOUS AND NON-SERIOUS ACCIDENTS 
 
 
Non-serious incidents (17%) are significantly lesser than serious incidents (83%). 
 
The rates of LOWI are similar for serious and not serious incidents. 
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The difference between serious and non-serious accidents is obvious in this chart. 
Major repairs for serious accidents are up to 77.67% when for non-serious are only 
9.52%. The same conclusion emerges for minor repairs, 20.39% and 71.43% 
respectively. 
4.3 EXPLOSION INCIDENTS 
4.3.1 CONDITIONS OF EXPLOSION ACCIDENTS 
 
Event Location 
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Explosion events are irrelevant to existance of facilities and congested waters, that is 
why no conclusion is emerged.  
Operational State 
 
 
Operating Condition 
  
 
Accidents mainly occur during the voyage and away from any port facility.  
Terminal areas 
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Loading Conditions 
  
 
Explosion starting Location 
 
 
The main area where explosions happen is the AFT area and especially the engine 
room.  
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Weather Impact 
 
 
4.3.2 CONSEQUENCES OF EXPLOSION ACCIDENTS 
 
Repairs   
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Explosion have a lot of casualties as it can be seen on the diagram above and on the 
diagram of injuries/ fatalities following. 
Outcome 
   
 
LOss of Water Integrity (LOWI) 
 None of the explosion accidents led to loss of water integrity. 
Injuries/ Fatalities 
 
The statistics above concern 10 accidents 8 of which included at least one person 
killed or serious injured. 
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Loss of Payload 
No loss of Payload. 
Release of Oil 
 
 No release of Oil. 
Release of hazardous Cargo 
 
One event led to release of hazardous cargo, that of a container with undeclared 
dangerous chemicals. 
4.3.3 FREQUENCIES OF EXPLOSION ACCIDENTS 
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Explosion incidents seem to be eliminated since 2004. Significant role to this might 
have played new regulations in force. 
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All three charts indicate that explosion events onboard are random incidents and 
only measures to avoid them can be taken. The fact that most of them occurred at 
AFT area signifies that there are a lot of initiating factors stored at this area of vessel. 
4.3.4 COMPARISON OF SERIOUS AND NON-SERIOUS ACCIDENTS 
 
 
No LOWI occurred on any accident. Major repairs were needed only on serious 
accidents in a percentage of 81.25% (13 out of 16 accidents). 
Number of non- serious accidents is small compared to serious accidents, therefore, 
it is wise to assume that rates of outcome in serious accidents are similar to that of 
all explosion incidents. Vessels involved in non- serious accidents all sailed by their 
means. 
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4.4 FIRE INCIDENTS 
4.4.1 CONDITIONS OF FIRE ACCIDENTS 
 
Event Location 
 
Almost half the fire incidents occur on open sea. 
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Operating Condition 
 
 
Accidents mainly occur during the voyage and away from any port facility, as the 
ones initiated by an explosion. 
Loading Conditions 
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Fire starting Location (Internal source- External- by lightning) 
 
The main area where fires ignite is the AFT area and especially the engine room. The 
above chart refers to 66 out of 77 fire accidents, because there is no relevant 
information on the remaining 11. 
Weather Impact 
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4.4.2 CONSEQUENCES OF FIRE ACCIDENTS 
Repairs 
  
Outcome 
   
  
Major repairs 
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Minor repairs 
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No damage 
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LOss of Water Integrity (LOWI) 
  
Injuries/ Fatalities 
 
Fire incidents have similar consequences to the crew members of the vessel as 
explosion incidents, but not as fatal as the latter (significant number of injuries, small 
amount of deaths). 
Loss of Payload 
The fact that 4 incidents had a result of 372 damaged TEUs is remarkable. 
Release of Oil 
 
 No release of Oil. 
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Release of hazardous Cargo 
 
. 
4.4.3 FREQUENCIES OF FIRE ACCIDENTS 
 
 
Ships built between 1982 and 1991 have more accidents caused by fire with an 
average of 3.1 accidents per year, when for the periods 1992- 2001 and 2002- 2009 
the average is nearly 2.6. 
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Fire incidents have an ascending tendency. That is abnormal considering the new 
regulations in force against fire. 
 
Vessels have fire incidents onboard mainly on their first decade of activation.  
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The frequency of fire incidents is stable between 0.1- 0.3%. 
 
4.4.4 COMPARISON OF SERIOUS AND NON-SERIOUS ACCIDENTS 
 
 
None of the non- serious accidents led to LOWI. 
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Fire accidents mainly result in injuries or fatalities rather than major repairs on the 
vessel. Most of the times repairs concern wiring facilities and not structural issues. 
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4.5 GROUNDING INCIDENTS 
4.5.1 CONDITIONS OF GROUNDING ACCIDENTS 
 
Event Location 
 
As expected areas with shallow waters are extremely common in grounding 
incidents. 
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Operational State 
  
Operating Condition 
  
 
There is no doubt about the fact that most accidents happen because of navigational 
problems, whether it is by human mistake or because of uncharted areas. 
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Loading Conditions 
 
Almost all vessels were loaded at the time of the incident. The fact that vessel’s draught is 
maximized when fully loaded may have led to grounding. 
Grounding Type 
 
It is obvious that grounding accidents occur mostly with the vessel capable of 
steering and course correction if needed. 
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Weather Impact 
 
4.5.2 CONSEQUENCES OF GROUNDING ACCIDENTS 
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Outcome 
  
 
LOss of Water Integrity (LOWI) 
  
Injuries/ Fatalities 
Only one crew member died on grounding incidents. 
Loss of Payload 
There were minor casualties of 4 TEUs in one accident. 
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Release of Oil 
 
  
A considerable amount of 780 tonnes of oil was released. 
Release of hazardous Cargo 
No release of hazardous cargo. 
 
4.5.3 FREQUENCIES OF GROUNDING ACCIDENTS 
 
 
Vessels built in 1994- 1998 tend to have more accidents related to grounding. 
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After 2002 ships seem to have an increasing tendency to grounding incidents. The 
remarkable is that since 1990 the range of this type of incidents was around 4 per 
year, when after 2002 increased dramatically to an average of 19. This is 4-5 times 
the previous average. 
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4.5.4 COMPARISON OF SERIOUS AND NON-SERIOUS ACCIDENTS 
 
 
Grounding incidents are classified as serious incidents in their majority. In 
collaboration with the fact that most of the incidents occur when vessels are under 
power, it is understandable why extension of damage is great. 
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Despite the fact of extensive damages, vessels did not lose their integrity and 
seaworthiness. 
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The last chart concerns 226 accidents in which the vessel departed from incidents’ 
location and was taken for repairs.  
 
4.6 HULL FITTINGS INCIDENTS 
4.6.1 CONDITIONS OF HULL FITTINGS ACCIDENTS 
 
Event Location 
 
 
Almost half the incidents occurred at open sea, where weather is an important 
aspect. 
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Operational State 
  
Operating Condition 
 
In port facilities incidents may occur due to human factor and misuse of equipment 
during loading or discharging TEUs. 
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It is by this chart that this theory collapses. Only two incidents occurred during 
discharging of Payload and three in total that happened because of misuse of 
equipment. 
Hull Fittings failure Type 
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Weather Impact 
 
At least 16 incidents out of 31 are caused due to heavy weather. This is a critical 
factor for TEUs and equipment that are susceptible of weather conditions. 
 
4.6.2 CONSEQUENCES OF HULL FITTINGS ACCIDENTS 
Repairs 
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Minor and major repairs are evenly spread. A difference will be observed in the 
comparison of serious and non serious accidents. 
Outcome 
  
LOss of Water Integrity (LOWI) 
  
Injuries/ Fatalities 
There have been only 4 non serious injuries. 
Loss of Payload 
Hull fittings failure has a direct effect on TEU loss. Therefore, the loss of 1074 TEUs in 
11 accidents is within expectations, especially when all of them are caused by lashing 
failure. 
Sailed by her 
means 
30 
96,77% 
Towed away 
1 
3,23% 
Hull Fittings Incidents - Outcome 
LOWI 
4 
12,90% 
Not LOWI 
27 
87,10% 
Hull Fittings Incidents - LOWI Occurred 
74 
 
KOPOUKIS APOSTOLOS DIPLOMA THESIS NTUA 2013 
Release of Oil 
 
  
100 tonnes of oil were released. 
Release of hazardous Cargo 
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4.6.3 FREQUENCIES OF HULL FITTINGS ACCIDENTS 
 
 
Ships built during the period 1994- 1998 have most incidents in this category. 
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In this type of incidents also, accidents tend to happen in the first decade of the 
ship’s activation. 
 
First of all, incidents related to hull fittings are limited to a small amoun. 
Furthermore, frequency of these incidents is not stable over the years. It varies 
between 0.05- 0.15%. 
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4.6.4 COMPARISON OF SERIOUS AND NON-SERIOUS ACCIDENTS 
 
 
Serious accidents are more than non serious, but still comparable. 
 
In general, loss of water integrity occurs in a minor percentage. Only 3 serious 
accidents and 1 non serious involved such a loss. 
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The segrecation of serious and non serious accidents is clear in the chart above. 
Most serious accidents led to major repairs, where non serious led to minor. 
As far as it concerns the outcome of the accidents, all ships involved in non serious 
accidents sailed by their means. Only one ship with a serious accident had to be 
taken in tow for repairs. 
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4.7 MACHINERY FAILURE INCIDENTS 
4.7.1 CONDITIONS OF MACHINERY FAILURE ACCIDENTS 
 
Event Location 
 
Machinery failure is irrelevant to the area the vessel is at the time of the incident. 
The only common factor is engine’s and all relevant machinery operation.   
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Operating Condition 
 
Nearly all incidents occur during voyage, a fact that complies with previous 
conclusion. 
Loading Conditions 
 
More than half of the vessels were loaded at the time of the incident. The "Unknown” 
percentage is considerable and indications suggest it should be added to other categories, so 
the following charts is more appropriate. 
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Machinery failure Type 
 
Propulsion system failure represents the majority of machinery failure incidents. All 
of them refer to main engine’s or auxiliary machineries’ problems. 
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Weather Impact 
 
 
4.7.2 CONSEQUENCES OF MACHINERY FAILURE ACCIDENTS 
Repairs 
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Outcome 
  
LOss of Water Integrity (LOWI) 
  
Injuries/ Fatalities 
Only four crew members injured on three machinery failure incidents. 
Loss of Payload 
110 TEUs were lost in one accident. 
Release of Oil 
 
No release of oil.  
Release of hazardous Cargo 
No release of hazardous cargo. 
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4.7.3 FREQUENCIES OF MACHINERY FAILURE ACCIDENTS 
 
 
 
Machinery failure on modern vessels had an increasing tendency until 2008, 
especially since 2001. 
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In general, as ships get older machinery failure incidents tend to decrease in number. 
 
The frequency of such incidents seems to increase over the years, with no obvious 
cause. Although, in two years (1998 and 2009) the frequency decreased to almost 
half of what it was last year (1197 and 2008). 
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4.7.4 COMPARISON OF SERIOUS AND NON-SERIOUS ACCIDENTS 
 
 
Non-serious accidents are significantly less than serious. Individually, machinery 
failure could not be assumed as a serious accident. Nevertheless, collateral damages 
such as fire in engine room and injuries caused by it as well as structural damages 
and delays for repairs, can be described as serious. 
No LOWI occurred in non-serious accidents. Additionally only 3 serious accidents led 
to loss of water integrity. 
 
Because of the much smaller percentage of other categories, it should be mentioned 
that the last three numbers represent 1 accident for “No Damage Reported”, 
“Broken up” and “Total Loss” each. 
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4.8 STRUCTURAL FAILURE INCIDENTS 
4.8.1 CONDITIONS OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE ACCIDENTS 
 
Event Location 
 
As in machinery failure incidents, structural failure is irrelevant to the location the 
vessel is at the time of the incident. 
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Operational State 
 
 
Operating Condition 
 
Proportion of incidents that occur during voyages is significantly greater than all 
other operating conditions. 
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Loading Conditions 
 
For half of the incidents the loading condition is unknown. For this reason it is beetter to 
assume that in the majority vessels were loaded at the time of the incident. 
Structural failure Type 
 
Structural degradation caused twice the accidents than excessive loading and it is 
considered the main reason for structural failure incidents. This is an issue that 
should concern IACS members and inspections being conducted onboard. 
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Weather Impact 
 
There is no information about the weather conditions in most of the accidents. For 
those that there is, heavy weather is the only reason for damages caused. 
4.8.2 CONSEQUENCES OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE ACCIDENTS 
Repairs 
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Outcome 
  
Although there three accidents led to a total loss, the majority of vessels was capable 
of sailing by own means. 
LOss of Water Integrity (LOWI) 
  
The two possible scenarios are equal separated.  
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Injuries/ Fatalities 
 
Despite the fact that a serious number of crew members were missing in this type of 
incidents, it is important to notice that these numbers concern only 2 accidents and 
30 missing people regard to a total loss of the vessel. 
Loss of Payload 
110 TEUs were lost in one accident. 
Release of Oil 
 
 
265 tonnes of oil were released in 7 structural failure incidents.  
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Release of hazardous Cargo 
 
4.8.3 FREQUENCIES OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE ACCIDENTS 
 
 
No fluctuation is observed on structural failure incidents, especially since maximum 
number of incidents per built year is low (3). 
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A small increase appears to exist on incidents per year. As in previous categories, 
accidents tend to occur in the first decade of activation. 
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If the number of the active fleet is taken in mind, the overall frequency per year 
seems to considerably decrease. 
4.8.4 COMPARISON OF SERIOUS AND NON-SERIOUS ACCIDENTS 
 
 
Serious accidents occur five times more frequently than non- serious. The fact that in 
some occasions accidents involve release of oil or polluting cargo contributes to this 
result.  
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Both cases involve a large amount of LOWI occurred. In fact, it is strangely observed 
that in non-serious accidents the percentage of LOWI is greater than in serious 
accidents. However, if we take in mind that 60% on non-serious represents 3 
accidents, when 48.15% on serious represents 13 accidents, it is obvious that in 
absolute numbers serious accidents involve LOWI more often. 
 
This fact is reinforced by the above chart, where non-serious accidents require only 
minor repairs or no damage has been sustained, when on the other hand 74% of 
serious accidents required major repairs. 
The following chart shows the outcome for serious accidents, because all ships 
involved in non-serious accidents sailed by their means. Overall, it is safe to come to 
a conclusion that most ships sailed by their means after a structural failure. 
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4.9 ALL INCIDENTS 
4.9.1 CONDITIONS OF ACCIDENTS 
 
Event Location 
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The majority of accidents occur at open sea or coastal waters, 24.94% and 25.02% 
respectively. 
Operational State 
 
All incidents are almost equally divided in 4 operational states. No safe conclusion 
can be drawn from this chart. 
Operating Condition 
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Proportion of incidents that occur during voyages is significantly greater than all 
other operating conditions. 
Loading Conditions 
 
More than half the vessels investigated were loaded at the time of the incident. 
Incident Category 
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Weather Impact 
 
There is a significant absence of weather condition’s information. 
4.9.2 CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 
 
Repairs 
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Outcome 
  
Although more ships required major than minor repairs, most of them were able to 
sail by their means for the necessary repairs. 
LOss of Water Integrity (LOWI) 
  
The rate of vessels with an intact water integrity after the accident is much greater 
than those with a LOWI occurred.  
Sailed by her 
means 
915 
70,44% 
Towed away 
377 
29,02% 
Broken up in situ 
1 
0,08% 
Not financially 
viable for repair 
1 
0,08% Total Loss 
5 
0,38% 
All Incidents - Outcome 
LOWI 
234 
18,01% 
Not LOWI 
1065 
81,99% 
All Incidents - LOWI Occurred 
102 
 
KOPOUKIS APOSTOLOS DIPLOMA THESIS NTUA 2013 
 
Injuries/ Fatalities 
 
Loss of Payload 
1914 TEUs were lost in 34 accidents. 
Release of Oil 
 
 
An amount of 3598 tonnes of oil has been verified to be released during the 
investigated accidents. 
  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Killed Missing Serious Injured Not Serious
Injured
19 
32 
16 
33 
All Incidents - Injuries fatalities 
Release of Oil 
48 
3,70% 
No Release of Oil 
1251 
96,30% 
All Incidents - Release of Oil 
103 
 
KOPOUKIS APOSTOLOS DIPLOMA THESIS NTUA 2013 
Release of hazardous Cargo 
 
 
4.9.3 FREQUENCIES OF ACCIDENTS 
 
 
The majority of ships were built in period 1993- 1998. 
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As years go by, more accidents occur during each year until 2008. From 2009 there is 
a rapid decrease of accidents’ number. 
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Overall, accidents’ average rate for the period of 1991- 2001 is much smaller than 
the one for the period of 2002- 2011 (2,20E-02 and 3,07E-02 respectively). 
Nevertheless it is important to be noted that 2001’s rate is at the levels of 2001 and 
almost at all times’ lowest. 
4.9.4 COMPARISON OF SERIOUS AND NON-SERIOUS ACCIDENTS 
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There is small difference in the relationship between LOWI and No LOWI incidents 
for the two categories. 
 
The repairs needed after an accident indicate the contrast of serious and non-serious 
accidents. 
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Almost all ships involved on any type of accident sailed by their means, whether it 
was a serious accident or not. 
 
Confidence intervals are presented on the basis of binomial confidence analysis and 
are calculated as 95% confidence intervals, corresponding to the 95% probability 
that certain values will be met. 
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Collision incidents tend to occur more often than any other type of incident every 
year. This may be, because collision incidents involve at least two vessels and the 
factor of human error is doubled compared to grounding and contact incidents. 
 
Machinery failure is expected to take place more frequently, since it involves a lot of 
equipment that are in use almost anytime, if not always. Structural and hull fittings 
failure incidents’ frequency all over the years are similar and extremely lower than 
previous mentioned categories.  
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Explosion incidents are rarer than fire incidents. The frequency for both types is low, 
however- as it can be seen in relevant chapter- the injuries and fatalities from these 
incidents are considerably common. 
Frequencies Collision Grounding Contact Fire Explosion Machinery Structural 
Hull 
fittings 
1990 2,12E-02 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 2,65E-03 0,00E+00 1,06E-02 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
1991 4,45E-03 6,68E-03 4,45E-03 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 6,68E-03 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
1992 7,55E-03 5,66E-03 1,89E-03 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 1,89E-03 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
1993 6,52E-03 1,63E-03 1,63E-03 1,63E-03 1,63E-03 8,15E-03 3,26E-03 0,00E+00 
1994 8,08E-03 4,04E-03 1,35E-03 4,04E-03 1,35E-03 5,38E-03 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
1995 1,13E-02 3,40E-03 3,40E-03 1,13E-03 0,00E+00 5,67E-03 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
1996 8,46E-03 3,76E-03 9,40E-04 9,40E-04 0,00E+00 5,64E-03 1,88E-03 0,00E+00 
1997 7,89E-03 4,74E-03 7,89E-04 7,89E-04 7,89E-04 7,89E-03 7,89E-04 0,00E+00 
1998 1,18E-02 1,97E-03 6,56E-04 1,31E-03 6,56E-04 4,59E-03 6,56E-04 2,62E-03 
1999 9,44E-03 2,95E-03 2,36E-03 1,18E-03 5,90E-04 4,13E-03 0,00E+00 0,00E+00 
2000 7,67E-03 1,10E-03 2,74E-03 2,19E-03 2,19E-03 3,84E-03 0,00E+00 5,48E-04 
2001 5,03E-03 2,51E-03 3,52E-03 1,51E-03 0,00E+00 5,53E-03 0,00E+00 5,03E-04 
2002 1,10E-02 3,65E-03 2,74E-03 1,37E-03 4,57E-04 7,76E-03 1,37E-03 1,37E-03 
2003 9,25E-03 4,63E-03 3,36E-03 2,10E-03 0,00E+00 5,89E-03 8,41E-04 2,52E-03 
2004 1,37E-02 7,45E-03 2,35E-03 1,57E-03 3,92E-04 8,62E-03 3,92E-04 0,00E+00 
2005 1,08E-02 6,85E-03 1,08E-03 1,80E-03 0,00E+00 7,57E-03 3,60E-04 1,08E-03 
2006 1,29E-02 6,47E-03 4,20E-03 2,59E-03 9,70E-04 1,00E-02 2,26E-03 3,23E-04 
2007 1,06E-02 6,04E-03 3,74E-03 1,15E-03 0,00E+00 1,09E-02 8,63E-04 5,75E-04 
2008 9,49E-03 7,69E-03 4,61E-03 2,56E-03 0,00E+00 1,23E-02 5,13E-04 7,69E-04 
2009 8,60E-03 6,45E-03 2,39E-03 1,20E-03 7,17E-04 7,41E-03 7,17E-04 1,43E-03 
2010 9,77E-03 3,64E-03 2,27E-03 2,05E-03 2,27E-04 6,82E-03 6,82E-04 0,00E+00 
2011 5,89E-03 4,36E-03 2,18E-03 1,09E-03 0,00E+00 5,23E-03 2,18E-04 2,18E-04 
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5. ANALYSIS OF NON IACS SHIPS’ SERIOUS INCIDENTS 
5.1 ALL INCIDENTS 
5.1.1 CONDITIONS OF ACCIDENTS 
 
Event Location 
 
Operational State 
 
All incidents are almost equally divided in 4 operational states. 
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Operating Condition 
 
The majority of incidents that occur during voyages is significantly greater than all 
other operating conditions. 
Loading Conditions 
 
More than half the vessels investigated were loaded at the time of the incident. 
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Incident Category 
 
Weather Impact 
 
There is a significant absence of weather condition’s information. 
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5.1.2 CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS 
 
Repairs 
 
Major repairs were effected on almost half of the incidents. 
Outcome 
  
Although more ships required major than minor repairs, most of them were able to 
sail by their means for the necessary repairs. 
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LOss of Water Integrity (LOWI) 
 
 
No LOWI occurred for the majority of accidents. 
 
Injuries/ Fatalities 
 
There is only one fatality on non-IACS ships. Nevertheless, it can’t be disregarded the 
fact that injuries and missing persons on 40 incidents of non-IACS vessels are almost 
30% of the ones for IACS vessels. 
Loss of Payload 
103 TEUs were lost in 2 accidents. 
  
LOWI 
4 
10,00% 
Not LOWI 
36 
90,00% 
Non IACS-Serious Incidents- LOWI Occurred 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Killed Missing Serious Injured Not Serious
Injured
1 
10 
0 
12 
Non IACS- Serious Incidents - Injuries 
fatalities 
115 
 
KOPOUKIS APOSTOLOS DIPLOMA THESIS NTUA 2013 
Release of Oil 
 
 
Release of hazardous Cargo 
No release of hazardous cargo. 
 
5.1.3 FREQUENCIES OF ACCIDENTS 
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It is a disadvantage of this study that there is no information of non-IACS ships’ 
accidents before 2002. 
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Frequencies of non-IACS ships are extremely high, twice as IACS ships’. This is 
because Fleet at risk of Non IACS vessels is small in comparison with the one for IACS 
vessels. 
5.1.4 COMPARISON OF IACS AND NON-IACS SHIPS’ ACCIDENTS 
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Similar outcome for both IACS and non-IACS ships, as well as loss of water integrity. 
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Based on the comparison of IACS and Non IACS ships, it is important also to state the 
fact that for IACS vessels a number of 4 total losses occurred with a frequency of 
8.35E-05, when for Non IACS vessels there was only 1 total loss with a respective 
frequency of 4.85E-04. Although, confidence intervals were calculated the same way 
for both occasions of IACS and Non IACS vessels, there is a great difference in results 
because of the small number of Non IACS incidents 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the previous paragraphs, there has been a statistical analysis of accidents on fully 
cellular containerships built after 1980 and with a gross tonnage (GT) greater than 
999 that occurred during the period 1990- 2011. 
First of all, it must be clarified that in the current study only the IHS database was 
used. Therefore it is expected to have several discrepancies with previous studies 
that included other databases- such as LMIU or GISIS- subject to different criteria. 
There are some incidents in both LMIU and IHS, which in one database are counted 
as serious and in the other as non- serious. In the NTUA-SDL database, all incidents 
can be characterized as serious or non- serious on a separate field (User opinion on 
incident severity) in order all incidents to be sorted with the same standards. 
It is obvious that in IHS database most accidents are considered to be serious, 1064 
(81,91%), rather than non- serious, 235 (18,09%) for ships registered to an IACS 
member. This is because criteria of IHS are more stringent than those of LMIU or 
GISIS and take also in mind human life or environment pollution as indication of a 
serious incident. 
In inverse proportion is the existence of loss of water integrity of the vessel after any 
type of incident. Overall, 18,01% of the incidents led to a state of LOWI which 
represents 234 incidents. Highest rates appear in structural failure accidents (50% - 
16 incidents), contact accidents (31,45% - 39 incidents) and grounding accidents 
(20,09% - 46 incidents). More restricted regulations of SOLAS as well as more 
frequently inspections onboard have a positive impact. 
Most of the incidents recorded are machinery  failure (26,69% and 20,00%), collision 
(34,03% and 25,00%) or grounding incidents (17,63% and 25,00%) for IACS and non 
IACS members’ ships respectively. It is important to notice that in both machinery 
failure incidents and grounding incidents the frequency of accidents peaked on 2008, 
which- combined with previous statement- led to an increased frequency of all 
incidents for ships of IACS members. 
Additionally, the majority of incidents occurred during voyage (1053 incidents or 
81,06% for IACS ships and 33 incidents or 82,50% for non IACS ships). It is completely 
logical that machinery failure and grounding incidents show the greatest rates in this 
category (94,22% and 94,32% respectively) considered the fact that both imply 
propulsion and steering systems operating. Besides this, on 74,49% of  grounding 
incidents vessel was on a fully loaded condition which enforced the grounding 
accident. Moreover, only in machinery failure incidents the rate of ship taken in tow 
was greater than “sailed by her mean” condition (63,29% and 36,42%). 
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Hull fittings and especially lashing arrangement have a direct impact on TEUs’ 
condition during voyage and loading- discharging procedures. Therefore, it was 
expected to have big losses of TEUs caused by lashing failure. In total, there was a 
loss of 1914 TEUs in 34 accidents for IACS ships- with an average of 56,3 lost TEUs 
per accident- and 103 TEUs in 2 accidents for non IACS ships- average is 51.5 TEUs. 
Because of the small amount of information on non IACS ships’ accidents, it is not 
wise to draw conclusions out of these facts. On the other hand, it is clear that hull 
fittings failure contains the greatest risk on TEUs’ safety with a total loss of 1074 
TEUs in 11 accidents and a risk of 2.24E-02. 
Incident type 
No of 
Incidents 
No of incidents 
with Loss of 
Cargo 
Frequency of 
Loss of Cargo 
Fleet TEU lost 
TEU lost 
per 
Incident 
Risk 
Collision 442 15 3,13E-04 47927,18 230 15,33 4,80E-03 
Contact 124 1 2,09E-05 47927,18 14 14,00 2,92E-04 
Explosion 18 0 0,00E+00 47927,18 0 0,00 0,00E+00 
Fire 77 4 8,35E-05 47927,18 372 93,00 7,76E-03 
Grounding 229 1 2,09E-05 47927,18 4 4,00 8,35E-05 
Hull fittings 
failure 31 11 2,30E-04 47927,18 1074 97,64 2,24E-02 
Machinery 
failure 346 1 2,09E-05 47927,18 110 110,00 2,30E-03 
Structural 
failure 32 1 2,09E-05 47927,18 110 110,00 2,30E-03 
TOTAL 1299   
      
An important objective of this study is also the environmental protection against the 
consequences of oil spill after ships’ accidents. For all types of incidents there has 
been a total of 3598 tonnes oil spill. The greatest rate for such an occasion appears 
on structural failure incidents with a percentage of 21,88% (7 out of 32 incidents) 
and 265 tonnes of oil spilled. Rates for collision and contact incidents are 3,39%(15 
out of 442 incidents) and 9,68%(12 out of 124 incidents) respectively. The amount of 
oil spilled is 620 and 1833 tonnes in order designated. If the definition of risk is taken 
in mind: ( Risk ) = ( Frequency ) x ( Consequences ) 
we have the following table: 
Type of incident 
Frequency 
(See below Table) 
Oil spill per 
incident (tonnes) 
Risk 
Collision 3.13E-04 620/15 = 41.33 1.29E-02 
Contact 2.50E-04 1833/12 = 152.75 3.82E-02 
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Type of incident 
Frequency 
(See below Table) 
Oil spill per 
incident (tonnes) 
Risk 
Explosion 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 
Fire 0.00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 
Grounding 2.71E-04 60/13 = 4.62 1.25E-03 
Hull fittings 0.00E+00 100/1 = 100 0.00E+00 
Machinery failure 0,00E+00 0.00 0.00E+00 
NASF 1.46E-04 265/7 = 37.86 5.53E-03 
 
and it is clear that contact incidents involve greatest risk. 
 
Incident type No of incidents Frequency of incident 
No of incidents 
with oil spill 
Frequency 
of oil spill 
Fleet 
Collision 442 9,22E-03 15 3,13E-04 47927,18 
Contact 124 2,59E-03 12 2,50E-04 47927,18 
Explosion 18 3,76E-04 0 0,00E+00 47927,18 
Fire 77 1,61E-03 0 0,00E+00 47927,18 
Grounding 229 4,78E-03 13 2,71E-04 47927,18 
Hull fittings failure 31 6,47E-04 1 2,09E-05 47927,18 
Machinery failure 346 7,22E-03 0 0,00E+00 47927,18 
Structural failure 32 6,68E-04 7 1,46E-04 47927,18 
TOTAL 1299 2,71E-02 
    
As far as the human life in danger is concerned, the most dangerous types of 
incidents are: 
 Explosion incidents with 11 persons killed, 12 serious injured, 2 persons non- 
serious injured and 1 person missing 
 Collision incidents with 4 persons killed and 3 non- serious injuries 
 Fire incidents with  3 persons killed, 4 persons serious injured, 18 non- 
serious injured and 1 person missing 
 Grounding incidents with 1 person killed 
 Structural failure incidents with 2 non- serious injuries and 30 missing crew 
members in a total loss of the vessel under heavy sea. 
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Although non IACS members’ ships’ accidents (40) are much lesser than IACS 
members’ (1299), it is noticeable that these incidents led to a comparable amount 
(approximately 1/3) of persons missing or with a non- serious injury. 
It must also be noted that there was no information of weather conditions during 
the accidents for the majority of records. This information would be extremely 
helpful and descriptive for the purposes that led to an incident. For example, many 
of collision and grounding incidents occurred during heavy weather, but for 76,47% 
and 79,04% respectively there was no information about the weather. 
Finally, a comparison with previous results of Safedor FSA is necessary. It should be 
reminded that some accidents of LMIU may be included in IHS database and 
indicated by the LMIU-info and LMIU-severity on the “Enhanced info” section of the 
NTUA- SDL database. 
SAFEDOR FSA-Sampling plan 
 
 Input database: LMIU 
 Fully cellular containerships (UCC) 
 Calculated period: 1993-2004 
 Ships with minimum DWT are 
excluded (<100GT, LMIU 
provision). 
 All incidents regardless the 
degree of accident’s severity. 
 
Updated results-Sampling Plan 
 
 Input databases: IHS 
 Fully cellular containerships  
 Calculated period: 1990-2011 
 Excluded ships <999 GT  
 Excluded ships built before 1980 
 Included only IACS ships 
 All incidents regardless the 
degree of accident’s severity 
 
SAFEDOR FSA-Investigated hazards 
 
 Collision 
 Contact 
 Grounding 
 Fire/Explosion 
 Water ingress in container hold 
 
Updated results-Investigated hazards 
 Collision 
 Contact 
 Grounding 
 Fire 
 Explosion 
 Non-accidental structural failure 
 Hull Fittings failure 
 Machinery failure 
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SAFEDOR FSA 
Incident type No of incidents Percentage Fleet at risk Frequency 
Collision 473 34,88% 30682 1,54E-02 
Contact 107 7,89% 30682 3,49E-03 
Stranded 173 12,76% 30682 5,64E-03 
Fire/ Explosion 108 7,96% 30682 3,52E-03 
Hull damage 42 3,10% 30682 1,37E-03 
Machinery 453 33,41% 30682 1,48E-02 
 
Updated results 
Incident type No of incidents Percentage Fleet at risk Frequency 
Collision 442 34,03% 47927 9,22E-03 
Contact 124 9,55% 47927 2,59E-03 
Grounding 229 17,63% 47927 4,78E-03 
Fire 77 5,93% 47927 1,61E-03 
Explosion 18 1,39% 47927 3,76E-04 
NASF 32 2,46% 47927 6,68E-04 
Hull fittings failure 31 2,39% 47927 6,47E-04 
Machinery failure 346 26,64% 47927 7,22E-03 
 
 
 
 
The percentage of contact and stranded (grounding) incidents has been increased 
compared to other categories. 
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The above diagram outlines the decrease of frequencies for all type of incidents. 
Especially on collision and machinery incidents there is a drop to almost half the FSA 
frequency. This fact is encouraging, considering that the main difference between 
Safedor FSA and the updated results is the period 2004 until 2011.  
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8. ANNEX 1: MANUAL OF NTUA- SDL DATABASE 
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CONTAINERSHIPS INCIDENT 
DATABASE 
SHIP DESIGN LABORATORY 
NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY 
OF ATHENS  
 
MANUAL 
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CLASSIFICATION AND APPROVAL 
 
Classification:   Restricted 
 
DEFINITION 
  
PU = Public 
 
PP = Restricted to other programme participants  
 
RE = Restricted to a group specified by the consortium  
  
CO = Confidential, only for members of the consortium  
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Preamble 
The Containerships Incident Database “Container-Database.mde” has been set-up 
by NTUA-SDL in MS ACCESS 2007 format and can run at any PC computer employing 
MS Office 2007 (and upwards). In its present form, the database includes accidental 
data of cellular containerships, as they were available to the Germanischer Lloyd. 
These data were imported into the database by NTUA-SDL to enable the further 
analysis of the data by both organisations. The present instructions manual aims at 
explaining some basic features of MS ACCESS 2007 and at supporting the analysis 
work of prospective Containerships Incident database users. 
General Instructions 
After opening the “Container-Database.mde”  file, the Main Switchboard / menu 
appears, as shown in the figure below. It contains the following four options, 
namely: 
i. Enter/View records 
ii. Exit this database 
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By clicking on the button “Enter/View Records”, the casualties’ form appears. 
 
 
 
The first part of the casualties’ form (General Data) contains five different tabs (Ship 
Info - Incident Info - Weather Info - Human Info - Misc Notes) and present general 
data, initially obtained by Germanischer Lloyd MS Excel files. 
More specific: 
Ship Info tab, contains general characteristics of the ship involved in the incident, 
following the definition of IHS Commercial Casualty Database. 
In the right-down red box, the possibility of other initial source information is 
registered. In the vast majority of serious incidents’ recording the main source in IHS 
Commercial Casualty Database. 
 
Notes: 
 If the particular record is coming only from LMIU database then tick the box 
“LMIU-info”. 
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 If the particular record is coming from IHS but exists also in LMIU database then 
the accident’s degree of severity according to LMIU is registered in the relevant 
box “LMIU-Severity”. 
 If the particular record is coming only from GISIS database then tick the box 
“GISIS-info”. 
 If the particular record is coming from IHS but exists also in GISIS database then 
the accident’s degree of severity according to GISIS is registered in the relevant 
box “GISIS-Severity”. 
 Finally, in cases that there is no convergence on the categorisation of incident’s 
severity then the user/analyst can register his personal opinion.  
 
The tabs “Incident Info”, “Weather Info”, “Human Life Info” and “Misc Notes” are 
related to the incident event, to related weather conditions, to the loss of life 
because of the accident and general notes relevant to the incident. These tabs will 
be analysed in the next sections of this document.   
 
After studying the available texts, the user/analyst should decide on the main 
accident/incident type. It is strongly recommended, when deciding on the main 
accident/incident type, to take into account the proposed categorization of the 
accident, as laid down in the box “Incident Category”.  
 
The user/analyst should then proceed and select by the drop-down menu one of the 
“Incident Category” fields, namely: 
1. Structural Failure 
As Non-Accidental Structural failure (NASF) is defined any hull damage such as cracks 
and fractures, affecting ship’s seaworthiness or efficiency.  
 
2. Hull Fittings 
As Failure of Hull Fittings is defined any damage to ship’s hull-fitting 
equipment/outfitting, affecting ship’s seaworthiness or efficiency. 
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3. Collision 
When the investigated vessel is the striking one or being struck by another ship, 
regardless of whether under way, anchored or moored. This category does not 
include striking wreck. 
 
4. Contact 
When the investigated vessel is striking any fixed or floating object other than those 
included under collision and grounding. 
 
5. Grounding 
When the investigated vessel being aground or hitting/touching shore, sea bottom 
or underwater objects (wrecks, etc.) 
. 
6. Fire 
Where fire is the first initiating event reported. 
7. Explosion 
Where explosion is the first initiating event reported.  
8. Machinery Failure  
Where a technical failure of machinery or related system affecting ship’s 
seaworthiness or efficiency. In addition, any damage to vessel’s propeller, propeller 
portion or propeller adjoining parts is registered as machinery failure as well as any 
damage to a vessel rudder, or rudder-adjoining parts.  
 
9. War Loss/Hostilities 
10. Occupational 
Occupational hazards with the potential of injuring, or in special circumstances even 
kill, individual crew members.  
 
139 
 
KOPOUKIS APOSTOLOS DIPLOMA THESIS NTUA 2013 
Once the selection of the main accident/incident type has been made, then the 
user/analyst should click on the relevant tab button (controller) of the particular 
main accident/incident type in order to proceed with the completion of the relevant 
fields.  
 
For exiting the database form and returning to the Main Switchboard / menu, the 
user/analyst should tick the cross button of the database form window (the bold “x”, 
but not the red coloured cross box of the MS Access above it, as this will lead to an 
exit from the database and no further actions can be taken). 
Any data filled in the database form will be automatically saved when exiting. It is 
recommended before exiting the input session, to make sure that the input data are 
correct, as they will be automatically saved in the relevant MS Access database file. 
Revision of this data can be done any time since there is no “frozen action” 
operation of the database.  
In the following, some guidance is provided for the proper interpretation of the laid-
down FT scheme and the correct use of the database. 
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ACCIDENTAL CAUSAL DATA 
 
8.1 FT-1: (Non-accidental) Structural Failure 
 
If “Structural Failure” is selected, the user/analyst can choose from a drop-down 
menu one of the following three options: 
 
 Structural degradation 
 Poor design or construction  
 Excessive loading  
 
 
 
If the user/analyst chooses “Structural degradation”, the user/analyst should click on 
the one and only choice of the “Structural degradation” drop-down menu: 
 Inadequate Maintenance / Ineffective Inspection AND Fatigue 
/ Corrosion  
If “Poor design or construction” is selected, then the user/analyst has no further 
choices/no further input requested. 
If the user/analyst chooses “Excessive loading”, the user/analyst should select one 
choice of the following drop-down menu: 
 Operation in abnormal conditions  
 Ballast related  
 Cargo related  
 
8.2 FT-2: Failure of Hull Fittings 
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If “Failure of Hull Fittings” is selected the user/analyst should choose from the 
“Failure of Hull Fittings” drop-down menu one of the following two options: 
 Equipment Failure 
 Misuse of equipment 
 
 
 
If the user/analyst chooses “Equipment Failure”, the user/analyst should select one 
choice of the following drop-down menu: 
 Failure of closing systems  
 Chain locker failure  
 Manhole failure  
 Water Leakage through Ventilation Lines 
 Equipment/Outfitting Failure 
 Lashing Failure  
 
If the user/analyst chooses “Misuse of equipment”, the user/analyst should select 
one choice of the following drop-down menu: 
 Misuse of Chainlocker 
 Manhole left open 
 Ventilation lines incorrectly open 
 Misuse of Loading Equipment  
 
 
8.3 FT-3 : Collision 
 
If “Collision” is selected, the user/analyst then proceeds with choosing from the 
“Collision” drop-down menu the one and only choice:  
 Struck 
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 Striking 
 Unknown 
 
 
 
If there are further details in the particular record, the user/analyst should choose 
one of the following options of the “Collision Avoidance Manoeuvre” drop-down 
menu:  
 Failed Last Minute and Close-quarter avoidance 
 
For the “Failed last-minute avoidance”, the user/analyst can choose one of the 
following options of the drop-down menu: 
 Combined avoidance causes collision 
 Ship fails to avoid collision  
 Internal communication Problem  
 Crash stop failed  
 
For the “Failed close quarter avoidance”, the user/analyst can choose one of the 
following options of the drop-down menu: 
 Ineffective early avoidance action 
 Ship forced to accept collision hazard  
 Own ship unaware of collision course  
 
For the “Containership Fails Avoid”, the user/analyst can choose one of the following 
options of the drop-down menu: 
 Failure to supervise route 
 Failure of collision avoidance manoeuvre  
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8.4 FT-4: Contact 
 
If “Contact” is selected, in the “Contact” tab the user/analyst should choose one of 
the following options of the “Contact” drop-down menu: 
 With floating object  
 With fixed installation  
 
 
 
If “With floating object” is selected, the user/analyst should click one of the choices 
of the following drop-down menu: 
 Object not detected 
 Object detected but not avoided 
 
If “Floating Object not detected” is selected, the user/analyst should click on the one 
and only choice of the following drop-down menu: 
 No visual detection from bridge & Equipment Failure 
 Human Error 
 
Further on, the user/analyst has the possibility of choosing between the following 
two options on the “No Visual Detection Because” box: 
 Environment (poor visibility) 
 Watchkeeping failure 
 
If “Object detected but not avoided” is selected, the user/analyst should click on one 
of the following options of the drop-down menu: 
 Manoeuvring Avoidance Error 
 Internal communication Failure 
 Steering system failure 
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 Propulsion system failure 
 Bad environmental conditions 
 
If “With fixed installation” is selected:  
If “Contact Fixed Installation Not Avoided” is selected, the user/analyst should click 
on one of the following options of the drop-down menu: 
 Manoeuvring Avoidance Error 
 Internal communication Failure 
 Steering system failure 
 Propulsion system failure 
 Bad environmental condition 
 
If “Object not detected” is selected, the user/analyst should select one of the 
following two options: 
 Object Not mapped    
 Ship unaware of striking hazards 
 
If “Object not mapped” is chosen, then there are no further choices in this tab to be 
made.  
 
If “Ship unaware of striking hazard” is chosen, then the user/analyst should click on 
the one and only choice of the following drop-down menu: 
 VTS Failure & Uncorrected Navigational Error & External 
Communication Failure 
 
8.5 FT-5: Grounding 
 
If “Grounding” is selected, the user/analyst should choose from a drop-down menu 
one of the following three choices: 
 Drift Grounding 
 Powered Grounding 
 Unknown 
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Notes: 
 
 Whenever “Low tide” is reported, the “Grounding” is considered as “Drift 
Grounding”. 
 Whenever no problem on propulsion or steering system is reported, the 
“Grounding” is considered as “Powered Grounding”. 
 When the “Towed Away” tick-box is ticked, then it should not be “Powered 
Grounding”  
 When “Sailed By Her Means” is ticked, then it definitely concerns “Powered 
Grounding”  
 
If “Drift Grounding” is selected, the user/analyst should click on one of the choices of 
the following drop-down menu: 
 Propulsion / Steering System Loss & Drift to Shallow Water 
 
The user/analyst should then proceed and make input to the following two options, 
to the extent feasible: 
 Loss of propulsion system 
 Loss of steering system 
 
If “Powered Grounding” is selected, the user/analyst should click on one of the 
choices of the following drop-down menu: 
 Detected but not avoided  
 Squat Effect  
 Not detected 
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8.6  FT-6: Fire 
 
If “Fire” is selected as a first event, then the user/analyst should tick the field “Fire as 
a first event” in the relevant “Fire” tab. If there are available further data, then the 
user/analyst can proceed with choosing from the “Fire Starting Location” drop-down 
menu one of the following choices: 
 Internal source 
 External source 
 By lightning 
 
 
 
If the choice is “Internal source”, then there is the following drop-down menu: 
 In Aft Area 
 On Deck Cargo Area 
 In Ballast Tanks/Void Spaces 
 In Hold Cargo Area 
 In Fore Peak Area 
 
If the choice is “In Aft Area”, then there is the following drop-down menu: 
 On superstructure 
 Other Areas 
 Engine Room 
 
If the choice is “On superstructure”, then there is the following drop-down menu: 
 Accommodation 
 Bridge 
 
Then, the user/analyst should complete any information on “Ignition Source” box, 
where there is the following drop-down menu: 
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 Electrostatic charges 
 Cooking related 
 Heating equipment 
 Hot works 
 Smoking related 
 Electrical faults 
 Broken Fuel Pipe 
 Self-Ignition 
 Containers’ Content 
 Engine’s Crankcase 
 Unknown 
Finally, the user/analyst should complete any available information on “Fire 
Extinguished within” box [in hours] and tick “YES” if the incident was followed by and 
explosion. 
 
8.7 FT-7: Explosion 
 
If “Explosion” is selected as a first event, then the user/analyst should tick the field 
“Explosion as a first event” in the relevant “Explosion” tab. If there are available 
further data, then the user/analyst can proceed with choosing from the “Explosion 
Location” drop-down menu one of the following choices: 
 In Hold Cargo Area 
 In Aft Area 
 On Deck Cargo Area 
 Ballast Tanks/Void spaces 
 In Fore Peak Area 
 
 
 
If the choice is “In AFT Area”, then the other boxes (apart from “Ignition Source”) 
freeze and there is the following drop-down menu: 
 Fuel Tank 
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 Boiler 
 Accommodation 
 Engine Room 
 
If the choice is “On Deck Cargo Area”, all the boxes (apart from “Ignition Source”) 
freeze and there are no further choices to be made. 
 
Then, the user/analyst should complete any information on “Ignition Source” box, 
where there is the following drop-down menu: 
 Electrostatic charges 
 Cooking related 
 Heating equipment 
 Hot works 
 Smoking related 
 Electrical faults 
 Broken Fuel Pipe 
 Self-Ignition 
 Containers’ Content 
 Engine’s Crankcase 
 Unknown 
Finally, the user/analyst should tick “YES” in the field “Followed Fire” in the relevant 
“Explosion” tab if the Incident was followed by fire. 
 
8.8 FT-8: Unknown reasons 
 
If “Unknown reasons” is selected, (due to e.g. lack of information), in the relevant 
tab the user/analyst should tick “YES”.  
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8.9 FT-9:  Machinery Failure 
If “Machinery Failure” is selected, in the relevant tab the user/analyst can choose 
from a drop-down menu one of the following three choices: 
 Steering System Failure 
 Propulsion System Failure 
 Rudder Damage 
 Propeller Damage 
 Bow Thruster Damage 
 Turbo Charger Problem 
 Other 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 The tailshaft is considered as part of the machinery and more particularly of the 
propulsion system. Thus, failure of tailshaft is a mechanical failure related to 
propulsion. 
 It is also noted that in this accident type also belongs the Crankshaft failure. 
Furthermore, wherever the main engine crankshaft fails, “propulsion failure” 
should be checked; wherever the auxiliary engine crankshaft fails, “other failure” 
should be checked. 
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ACCIDENTAL CONSEQUENCES & OTHER DATA 
After the accidental causal data according to the main accident/incident type and 
fault trees has been completed (to the extent feasible), the user/analyst is asked to 
complete any other information (consequences of accidents/incidents and general 
information about the accident/incident) that can be extracted by the texts 
available, namely: 
8.10 Incident Info tab 
 
 
 
Event Location: The user/analyst should complete the location of the ship at the 
time of the incident, as possibly reported in the relevant texts. The user/analyst has 
the following options: 
1 Port 
2 Inland waters 
3 Canal 
4 River 
5 At berth 
6 Anchorage 
7 Port Approach 
8 Archipelagos 
9 Coastal waters (<12miles) 
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10 Open sea 
11 Restricted Waters 
12 Shipyard 
13 Dry-dock 
14 Unknown 
Operating Condition: The user/analyst should complete the ship operation when the 
incident occurred, as possibly reported in the relevant texts. The user/analyst has 
the following options: 
1 Under repair 
2 Berth 
3 Port 
4 Discharging 
5 Sailing / En-route 
6 Anchoring 
7 Ballasting 
8 Bunkering 
9 Loading 
10 Manoeuvring 
11 Towed 
12 Mooring 
13 Under construction 
14 Unknown 
 
Additionally, there are boxes to be checked (Weather Info tab) in case of availability of 
relevant environmental data, namely: 
Outcome of the incident 
 
The user/analyst should tick one or more of the following boxes, according to the 
information available: 
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1. L.O.W.I. (Loss Of Watertight Integrity) occurred  
2. Broken In (two or more) Pieces 
3. Total Loss 
4. Remains Afloat 
5. Towed Away  
6. Sailed By Her Means  
7. Minor Repairs  
8. Major Repairs  
9. Broken Up 
10. No Damage Reported 
11. No Damage Sustained 
12. Release of oil 
13. Release of hazardous/polluting cargo 
Notes 
 It is noted that in the vast majority of records, whenever “Remains Afloat” is 
ticked, the “Sailed By Her Means” box is also ticked. 
 Whenever the accident/incident took place while the ship was “Under repair”, 
(see “Operating Condition” field) or the “Event Location” is either “Berth” or 
“Anchorage”, the “Remains Afloat” tick-box should NOT be ticked. 
 It is also noted that whenever “Broken Up” is ticked, the repairs are already 
considered as “Major”, that’s why the relative tick-box should not be ticked. 
 A few conventions for deciding on whether a repair is major are presented 
below:  
i. if it requires hull check by Class, it is major 
ii. if it involves a shipyard, it would tend to be major  
iii. if it takes a number of days for the repair, it is rather major (but bearing in 
mind that the ship may be idle for other reasons such as lack of business).  
The user/analyst should also consult the IHS code on “Degree of severity” of the 
casualty to take a hint on the magnitude of the damage (and thus, of the repair). 
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8.11 Weather Info tab 
 
 
Seaway condition, Significant Wave Height Hs [m] 
If this tick-box is checked, because there is relevant information available, the 
significant wave height Hs [m] should be completed in the relevant text box.  
In case of lack of definite Hs data, the following indicative convention should be 
adopted: 
Seaway condition Hs [m] 
Calm sea 0 
Mild sea 2.5 
Moderate sea 5 
Strong sea 7.5 
Very rough sea 10 
Abnormal sea 15 
Notes: 
 For calm sea conditions, or seaway conditions not affecting the incident/accident, 
the box "Seaway" is ticked and the following Hs text box  should be set equal to 
zero value, Hs = 0 m. 
 For heavy (or ‘bad’) weather, the tick box of “Seaway” should be checked and an 
indicative Hs = 7.5m.  
 If it is reported "hurricane" or "typhoon", the user should tick the box "Abnormal 
sea". For in between the user should use 'common sense' to interpret situations 
like 'bad weather', 'heavy sea', etc.  
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Wind, Beaufort Force [Bf] 
If this tick-box is checked, the relevant Beaufort force should be completed in the 
relevant text box.  
For calm wind conditions, or wind condition not affecting the accident, it should be set 
equal to zero, Bf = 0. 
The Beaufort Wind Scale is shown next: 
 
Beaufort number 
Wind Speed 
(knots) 
WMO(*)description 
1 < 1 Calm 
2 1 - 3 Light air 
3 4 - 6 Light breeze 
4 7 - 10 Gentle breeze 
5 11 - 16 Moderate breeze 
6 17 - 21 Fresh breeze 
7 22 - 27 Strong breeze 
8 28 - 33 Near gale 
9 34 - 40 Gale 
10 41 - 47 Strong gale 
11 48 - 55 Storm 
12 56 - 63 Violent storm 
 
For example, for “typhoon” is Bf = 11, for “hurricane” is Bf = 12, whereas “storm” 
starts at about Bf 7 
 
Ice – Poor Visibility 
This tick boxes should be checked, in case icing affected the accident or Poor Visibility. 
 
                                                             
(*)World Meteorological Organization 
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8.12 Human Info tab 
No. of Serious Injuries: The user/analyst should complete the total number of 
seriously injured people, as possibly reported in the relevant texts.  
 In case it is clearly reported that there are no seriously injured persons, the 
user/analyst should fill in the box with zero (0) value. In case there are no clues 
(unknown) on serious injuries, the box should remain empty. 
No. of Non-Serious Injuries: The user/analyst should complete the total number of 
non-seriously injured people, as possibly reported in the relevant texts. 
 In case it is clearly reported that there are no people who suffered from non-
serious injuries, the user/analyst should fill in the box with zero (0) value. In case 
there are no clues (unknown) on non-serious injuries, the box should remain 
empty. 
 
 
No. of Killed: The user/analyst should complete the number of killed people, as 
possibly reported in the relevant texts. 
 In case it is clearly reported that there are no killed persons, the user/analyst 
should fill in the box with zero (0) value. In case there are no clues (unknown) on 
any deaths, the box should remain empty. 
 Zero values should be inserted in case it is clearly deduced from the texts that no 
deaths are involved.  
No. of Missing: The user/analyst should complete the number of missing people, as 
possibly reported in the relevant texts. 
 In case it is clearly reported that there are no missing persons, the user/analyst 
should fill in the box with zero (0) value. In case there are no clues (unknown) on 
any missing persons, the box should remain empty. 
 
